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challenge seriously, and many still do not.
But many did, and quite a number of philoso
phers may be found today aIOOng the activist
membership of the environmental and antivivi
sectionist movements.

made by Sandra Harding ( a non-establishment
feminist philosopher)?
Profound transforma
tions have indeed occurred, however. Many of
philosophy's
traditional
preoccupations
still hold sway, but there is also a growing
awareness that philosophy cannot
divorce
itself from the real world.
Thus, recent
decades have seen the rapid developnent of
fields of "applied philosophy, n such as busi
ness ethics, environmental ethics, and medi
cal ethics. But of oucrse, it is not "philo
sophy"--sane abstract entity--that undergoes
tunnoil and radical change but thethought and
lives of individual philosophers. Like mine,
for instance. Let me explain.

With some trepidation, but also not a
little smugness, I took on the mantle of
speciesism.
However, Singer's writings un
settled me, and I soon saw that speciesism
was lUltenable.
For whatever set of charac
teristics one might single out that designate
our species as deserving of full IOOral consi
deration, one can ask whether it would be
rational to exclude members of another spe
cies that shared all these characteristics
(e.g., Martians) from equal consideration
just because their physical appearance was
different.
Clearly this would be absurd.
But I could not yet see that this kind of
thinking, as well as the hierarchical view of
humans as superior to all else in natUre, to
which I still adhered, were indeed analogous
to those specious and loathsome arguments
used to pranote racism and sexism.
(I still
disagree
with Singer on some
important
points, but at least I've seen the light on
this one.)

In 1975, when Peter Singer published his
book Animal Liberation: ~ New Ethics for OUr
Treatment of Animals, I was readily able to
dismiss its unorthodox and polemical thesis
that "all animals are equal."
Singer, who
coined the tenn "animal liberation, " also
popularized another, "speciesism," which he
defined as "a prejudice or attitude of bias
toward the interests of members of one's own
species and against those of members of other
species. "[ 1]
He claimed that speciesism is
analogous to other founs of oppression, such
as racism and sexism.
To me, as to most
other philosophers at the time, these ideas
appeared wrongheaded in the extreme.
They
were misguided because of course everybCldy
knows· only humans matter, ethically speaking.
Or so I thought.
Animal suffering could and
should concern us, because we can empathize
with animals, and we wish to avoid causing or
pennitting suffering because it is better to
bekfud than to be indifferent or cruel. But
basically animals, like the rest of nature,
were' understood to have no intrinsic value,

I carried on in the same vein for seve
ral years, publishing papers, speaking at
conferences, and serving as a consultant to
various organizations on the subject of the
ethics of ani.mal experimentation.
All this_
activity culrnihated in the publication, early
last year, .ofmy book The Case for. Animal
Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical
Perspective.
But much happened to me after
that, and the book is now an- embarrassnlEmt to
me, a work so foreign-sounding that when I
re-read it, it seems as though it must have
been written by someone else.

only instrumental value, that is, use-value
or else value relative to the enjoyment or
enriclunent they bring to our lives.

In spite of my arguments in' the boQk for
IOOre humane animal care and use, including an
appeal for better eduqation for scientists
and other animal handlers, tighter legisla
tion governing research, and so on, I was
able to say the following:

It seemed easy to write off Singer's
arguments, falling back on the comfortable
human-centered ethical tradition for conven
ient counter-arguments.
I was intrigued by
the way in which Singer forced his readers to
confront some of the IOOst fundamental ques
tions of ethics and challenged their IOOst
deeply-held convictions. One had to ask, for
example, What is it that makes something a
subject of :noral concern?
What is a right?
What makes something a possessor of rights?
Is the capacity to suffer the universal cri
terion for IOOral considerability?
Most phi
~osophers, sa:3.
to tell, did not take the
BETWEEN THE SPOCIFS

beings that are IOOre valuable because
they have the attributes that identify
them as f1J.ll members of the IOOral corrmun
ity [Le. humans] may use less valuable
species, which lack some or all of these
traits, as means to their ends, for the
simple reason that they have no obliga
tion not to do so.
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begrudges in principle the humane and decent
sentiments he would apply in practice."[2]
These did not really hit hane, however, until
a close friend of mine, a woman who is a
radical feminist, made me confront the arbi
trariness of the patriarchal, hierarchical,
human-centered ethical theory I had adopted
and defended for so long, and had lacked the
courage to examine fully.
Like Kant, I was
"awakened frem my dogmatic slumbers," for
which my friend deserves the =edit.
Natur
ally, this was quite a jolt, and many person
al as well as philosopucal doubts rose up in
me.
I realized that I had had vague misgiv
ings about my arguments for sane time but
that I had avoided any serious questioning of
them.

I was able to conclude that "we have no duty
in the strict rooral sense to prevent animal
suffering. " Elsewhere I confidently asserted
that
natural objects and animals cannot have
value in themselves, though they can and
do have value if conscious beings capable
of valuing can perceive and interact with
them or i f such beings ' lives can be
rejuvenated or enriched by them in sane
way. • •• [V]alues and value judgments
arise and • • • talk of them makes sense
only in relation to a being such as Hem:>
sapiens.
I now look at these arrogant remarks
with dismay. How was it possible for someone
of reasonable intelligence and sensitivity to
hold theile views?
There are a mUllber of
explanatory factors:
personal advantage,
social conditioning, and the way we are
taught to do ethics are aroong them.
Several
kinds of reinforcement made it possible to
live with such a position as well, chief
aroong them being the fatherly or fraternal
approval I sought and received frem members
of the scientific community.

For several roonths I mulled this over.
I realized that I had to abandon the anthro
pocentric position I had taken.
I had to
face the painful decision to completely re
vise a new book-length manuscript on environ
mental ethics which was alroost two-thirds
=nplete. I wrote one o~ two things renounc
ing my previous book which appeared in print.
I did not foresee that thephenemenon of an
academic undergoing a change of mind and
publicly acknowledging the fact was so rare
as to be newsworthy.
But before long the

Philosophers, by and large, are trained
to do rooral philosophy as if they were posing
as judges applying abstract principles to
concrete cases. It is things like consisten

media began to cover the "event, II and I fel t
hard put not to have the whole matter turned
into a media circus.
To attempt to explain
myself to myself, and to other interested
persons with whem I'd spent many hours dis-'
cussing animal research over the past few
years, I fonnulated the position at which I
have now arrived. A version of this follows.

cy, objectivity, disinterestedness, imparti
ality, and rules that are drummed into us.
Against this background, it is easy to get
caught up in an abstract argument, an argu
ment for argument's sake; a certain roomentum
carries one along. But roorality is as much a
matter of feeling and 8lOOtion as of reason
and intellect.
(For those who always knew
this and practiced what they believed, my
apologies for taking so long to master this
simple point and for dismissing the people
who are roost concerned about animal welfare
as mere sentimentalists.)

Why Animal Experimentation

CANNOT Be Justified
On any theory of roorality, a basic prin
ciple is that we have an obligation to avoid
causing harm to others.
Whether this is the
roost fundamental moral principle may be de
bated, but it is about as important as any
that can be formulated.
The harm-avoidance
principle is scmetimes called "the principle
of nonmaleficence'." It applies straightfor
wardly of course only on the condition that
the actual or possible recipients of harm are
innocent:
it is wrong to harm (injure or
damage) those who are innocent of any wrong
doing, but not necessarily wrong to harm
those who seek to harm us.
It therefore
states a prima facie obliqation.

I continued on, after the book's appear
ance, basking in the warmth of the benefits
that scholarly publications bring to academ
ics, and in the general praise it received
frem the scientific community.
Then rather
suddenly my ccmplacency was derailed.
A
m.rrnber of critical reviews made me question
my assumptions. One stated that my "philoso
phical argument is superficial, dogmatic and
unconvincing," and went on to point out that
"Fox [offers] a curmudgeonly philosophy that
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singularly equipped to survive and dcminate.
All species have their strengths and weaknes
ses, and none is inherently superior or in
ferior to any other.
If we choose to cele
brate life, then how can we avoid affirming
the equal intrinsic value of all organisms?

Now why might it be thought that the
principle of nonmaleficence states our most
fundamental moral obligation?
sane litera
ture on the subject suggests that the reason
is that in the scale of things, it is a more
serious wrong to cause saneone to be worse
off than he/she would have been otherwise
than it is simplyto fail to help him/her.
The assumption here is that when one "merely
emits to perform a morally desirable act,
others are usually no worse off than they
were before the emission--they have just lost
out on sane further benefits they might have
enjoyed had the action been perfoJ:med." [3]

Whether or not animals ' lives and exper
iences have intrinsic value, however, does
not affect the central issue.
For if we
agree that their lives may be made either
better or worse by us, that they have a
welfare or wellbeing that may be injured by
us, then few would disagree that we can harm
animals and have an obligation to avoid doing
so.
Furthermore, it may be argued (and hu
mane scientists would agree) that we have a
more positive obligation toward them, namely,
to protect or prcmote their welfare.
But we'
cannot carry out this obligation by first
subjecting them to harmful acts.

Should the principle of nonmaleficence
be extended to animals? This question may be
met'with a question:
can animals be harmed?
If they can be, then what reason could there
be for not extending the principle to them?
But clearly animals ~ be harmed.
How can
this best be understood?
Charles Fried de
fines "physical harm" as "an impingement upon
the body which either causes pain or impairs
functioning. " [4] Fried, being a legal philo
sopher, recognizes that hanns ccmprise a
broader category of wrongs, including, for

life.

sions seldan,
if ever, benefit everyone
equally.
Sane group or groups always suffer
a negative impact.
Is it ever morally ac
ceptable or right to benefit fran the suffer
ings or disadvantages of others?
I think we
feel intuitively that this is wrong.
Yet
most, if not all of us, do so benefit.
Ideally, we would try to address this problem
by attempting to ccmpensate in' sane other way
those who lose something when a . particular
social policy or decision goes into effect.
Sanetimes this works, sometimes not. To the
degree that it does not work, or we do not
try to make it work, we have an unjust socie
ty.

example, damage to one's reputation and simi
lar intangibles.
others, like Tom Regan,
link hanns to having any sort of interest;
anything that has at least one kind of inte
rest, namely, an interest in its own welfare,
according to this theory, can be harmed. To
have an interest in this sense just means
that the being in question is capable of
faring well or faring ill, and to say that it
may be hanned is to say that actions of ours
may cause it to fare i l l in some significan
way. [5] Many experience pain, and some suf
fer psychologically as well. When we inflict
pain or suffering on animals, we harm them.
But harm may also result when we confine or
socially isolate them, deprive them of the
ability to behave in ways natural to their
species, or kill them.
Are these lesser
wrongs when the recipients of our harmful
behavior are animals than when they are hu
mans?

In addition to the hanns that result
from the operation of social policies, there
are also the direct or indirect hanns we
cause each other.
Here it is more manifest
that ~, not some impersonal bureaucracy, are
the agents of harm.
For this reason, it is
more obvious that, as a rule, we act wrongly
when we benefit fran the harm we cause. [6]
Whether this kind of wrong can be mitigated
by ccmpensation, I am not sure, but let us
suppose, for the sake of argument, that it
can be.

Sane have argued that hanns caused to
animals are of little or no ethical concern.
This is because they believe that animals'
lives and experiences are of no intrinsic
value, or of lesser value than those of hu
mans., But animals are living things, in many
and essential respects very much like our
selves.
They also possess unique character
istics as much as we do.
No species is
BE'IWEEN THE SPEX::IES

Perhaps hanns are an inevitable part of
In human society policies and deci

When we require animals to make sacri
fices for us, what ccmpensation do we offer
them?
None.
So how can it ever be morally
acceptable to benefit from their suffering?
When we perform cost/benefit analyses on
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animal research, if we consider the animals
at all, our assessment is primarily in tenns
of the cost to them versus the benefits for
us.
Sanetirnes we consider the benefits for
them as well, but generally we justify the
research if the benefits for us outweigh, by
some arbitrary, humancentered measure, the
costs to them.
Nor do they have any say in
the matter.

of animal experimentation in spite of the
rroral argument against it?
Away to live
with our consciences might be to do only
those experiments that are deemed rrost cru
cial, to rethink the entire range of ques
tions concerning the "need" for animal exper
imentation, to seriously seek alternatives at
every opportunity, and to ccmnit ourselves to
a finn policy of phasing out animal research
as rapidly as possible.

What does it mean to seek a justifica
tion for using animals as means to our ends?
To justify,
in this context, is to show that
sc:mething which appears, prima facie, to be
wrong is not wrong, or at any rate is less
wrong than it seemed to beJ it is also (rrore
importantly) to free ourselves frc:m blame or
guilt.
But if animals are capable of being
hanned, are beings that have intrinsic value,
and cannot be or are not compensated for the
banns we cause them, where is the justifica
tion to come frc:m?
question.

-IJ

_..

I see no answer to

Another way might be to try to define
the class of experiments (for which there are
at present no alternatives to the use of
animals) that might be I1Drally justified.
A
tentative list of these is the following:
1. Experiments that cause no hann (e.g.,
those that are noninvasiveJ clinical
observations of nonnal and pathological
conditionsJ field studiesJ those that
utilize alternatives to live animals).

this

2. Experiments that benefit the indivi
dual experimental an.i.!nals.

Humans are currently the dc:minant spe
cies on earth and exercise a great deal of
power and control over nature.
But very few
believe might makes right, so the fact that
we have greater power cannot enter into a
justification of our use and treatment of
animals.
Rather, where other beings are
under our power, we should feel obligated to
show self-restraint and to act out of mercy
and canpassion.

3. Experiments in which animals wil
lingly participate, where "willingly"
does not mean that some trivial "reward"
is offered to a previously deprived
animal (e.g., ape language learningJ
dolphin training).

4. Experiments where hann is caused but
for which offsetting (canpensating) be
nefits are given to the subjects.

We cannot avoid causing hann to other
beings in the process of living our own
lives.
Nor does rrorality consist in trying
to be perfect and pure.
But we can adopt an
orientation toward minimizing the arrount of
harm we cause and taking full responsibility
for it, seeing it for what it is.

that benefit other ani
mals of the same or different species.
5. Experiments

6. Experiments that are life-saving, and
where widespread loss of human life is
threatened directly by animals (e.g., as
disease carriers).

To justify animal experimentation is to
start at one end of a continuum.
Much of
what we do will be rrorally acceptable (in our
eyes), and we will chip away at the extremity
where what we do shades into cruelty.
I no
longer believe that a general rroral justifi
cation
of animal experimentation can be
given.
Suppose, then, that we begin at the
opposite end of the continuum.
No animal
experiments can be rrorally justified~ We act
wrongly when we do them. Does this mean that
we should all became antivivisectionists or
abolitionists? Yes.

(Classes 4 through 6,
doubtful candidates.)

however,

strike me as

***
This is as far as I have gotten to the
present time.
The task before me now is to
see whether the position I've arrived at
stands up to criticism and to explore its
implications.
For one thing, I have trouble
with the idea that humans are always in the
wrong insofar as what they do adversely af
fects the lives or welfare of other organ

What if we refuse to forego the benefits
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to ask ourselves which beings affected by our
actions matter ethically and take their wel
fare into account as IlUlch as our own.
What
bothers me about the way scientists look at
the ethics of animal exPerimentation is that
they generally asslU1le that using other spe
cies for research is justified if the bene
fits to humans (and/or animals) "outweigh"
the harms caused to the animals exPerimented

isms. Albert Schweitzer, who spent consider
able time trying to develop a "reverence for
life ethic," maintained that humans are al
ways "guilty" with respect to their actions
that have a negative impact of any kind on
nature or parts of nature.
But he acknow
ledged that we do these things (or some of
them at any rate) out of "tragic necessity,"
as when we kill things in order to feed and
clothe ourselves.
For him, "Reverence for
life is an inexorable creditor!" These ideas
remind me too much of the destructive myth of
"Original Sin," fram which we can never find
expiation.
But I understand the reason for
Schweitzer's anguish nonetheless.
Let me
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hasten to point out that while Schweitzer
wasn't IlUlch of a philosoIiJ,er, perhaps, he was
no fool.
It is no answer to his concern to
point out that after all., he was himself
inconsistent in eradicating disease germs and
in shooting predatory animals that threatened
his jungle camps.
For as he observed, one
who commits these deeds "is conscious of
acting on subjective grounds and arbitrarily,
and knOlV'S that he bears the responsibility
for the life which is sacrificed."[7]

for
Pacific Division Meeting
Portland, Oregon
March, 1988
Papers on any topic impacting ethi
cal issues concerning non-human animals
are welcome. Possible topics include:
The rroral (in)significance of being
natural (as opposed to domesticated or
genetically engineered)
Are Animal Liberation Front activities
consonant with an animal rights ethic?
Historical studies of conceptions of
the rroral standing of animals.

Humans differ fram other animals, it is
said, by virtue of having a conscience, and
hence by being able to assess their own be
havior ethically.
It is possible for us to
look at the whole of which we are part and
judge that our impact upon it is rrore harmful
than not.
But we are nevertheless part of
the total picture, for the time being at
least, and therefore have as much claim to
exist and flourish as any other species.
Does this entail doing animal experiments?
This is the second thing that troubles me.
For I knOlV' that much animal-based research
has been life-saving and life-enhancing for
both humans and animals.
And some would
argue that if we fail to do things that we
know or reasonably believe would save lives
or alleviate suffering, we would be causing
harm by omission, and hence acting wrongly in
this way.
But perhaps the answer to our
dilermna is first to abandon the notion that
animal experimentation is generally justifi
able rrorally, and then to examine each case
on its own merits, being prePared to admit
that we will sometimes act wrongly when we
decide to place our interests above those of
members of other species.
Thus we might
appeal routinely to a utilitarian form of the
principle of nonmaleficence:
that we "ought
not to act in a way which will do rrore harm
than good." [8] But in assessing this we have

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

Papers must be double-spaced and be
ten to fifteen pages in length.
Those
interested in submitting papers should
make their intention, along with an indi
cation of the projected topic, known as
soon as that is possible.
Final papers,
or substantive drafts, IlUlSt be received
by September 15, 1987.
Send statements of intent and papers
to:
Prof. Steve F. Sapontzis
DePartment of PhilosoIiJ,y
california State University
Hayward, california 94542.
Those interested in chairing the
session or in being cormnentators should
contact Prof. Sapontzis by September 15.
(Paper( s) and cormnents will be
lished in Between the Species.)
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THE EYE OF THE

upon.
The deeper question, raised earlier,
is never even asked:
Is it ever rrorally
acceptable for some beings to benefit from

WHALE

the harms they cause to other beings?
Would biomedical and behavioral research
cane to a halt if the above question were
asked and the result were that animal experi
mentation ceased?
Probably not, but this is
much too large an issue to get into here.
However, suppose it did cease.
The human
. species would doubtless continue to exist,
just as it did before animal experimentation
began, with a d:iminished lifespan and quality
of life, to be sure. Yet other institutions,
fr01l1 which humans individually and collec
tively have benefited--for example slavery-
have bee!?- abandoned for rroral reasons.
And
many rrore should be, for similar reasons,
such as the oppression of women, children,
the elderly, and marginal peoples, and the
pursuit of "superiority" in nuclear weapons.
I am not arguing here that animal experimen
tation should be stopped, only pointing out
that the fact that stopping it would cause us
much inconvenience and even misery is not the
end of the matter.

(dedicated to Paul Watson and the Sea Shefilerd)

I looked into the eye of the whale
and saw the person looking back at me,
and she said to me,
"You are witness.
You cannot now turn away, II
Nor could I.
Cords of light-
cords of steel
bind me to her
for all time
and wherever I am
and wherever she is.
They are my burden
and my joy.

PAULETTE CALLEN
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in rroral fililosofily that has already happened
in biology:
the evolution of our concept of
animals will merge with the evolution of our
concept of humanity, and we will cane to
recognize that together we all form one liv
ing, rrorally significant and worthy corrmunity
of interests on this planet.

ANIMALS.

Do they matter?
An exciting new awareness is
unfolding about our relationship
with animals and thE' rest of the
natural world. Read aonul it in
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Given current international tensions, one may
legitimately doubt our ability to think be
yondlX)litical borders, much less biological
ones.

ultimately of empirical denonstration. Every.
finding of the science of· ecology reinforces
our convron planetary destiny, and I have no
doubt that someday it will be CClIlllron know
ledge that all species "are in this toge
ther" •
But it is a further step to get
humans to act for the convron good.
I agree
with Bellah et. al. that to do so we must
revive the submerged language of civic virtue
--the republican tradition.
Only with the
restoration of the public lX)lity can Ameri
cans create a humane oommunity.

But I am concerned with lX)ssible accomp
lishments, not just easy ones.
It seems to
me that if Americans can be taught to think
of their duties to the 'Hider corrmunity of
which they are a part, and if their notion of
com'llllility can be expanded to encompass our
fragile planet's other inhabitants, basic and
radical changes will take place. The task is
two-fold:
to restore our sense of reslX)nsi
bility for our common life, and to expand our
notion of the COIllllOn to include our fellow
travelers on this blue-green ball.

Notes
1.
Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen,
William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven
M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart:
Individu
alism and Caumitment in American Life (Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1985).

The second step-expanding our notion of
oommllility--is a matter of education, and

THE CALF'S
PRAYER
REBECCA CHAPMAN
Shall I be born unto this land
Of majestic mountains and fruited plains?
'1'0 stand on eager, fragile limbs?
To breathe the spirit of life?
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Ibid: 15-16.
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Finally, to be consistent, the argument
that benefiting from harms caused to other
fu.imals is always wrong should be applied to
other parts of one's life, as much as lX)ssi
ble. This means giving up animals and animal
products for food, clothing, and so on, ex
cept when it is absolutely essential to use
them.
It would also require an entire re
evaluation of one's relationship to nature.
It means, in short, nothing less than the
search for a whole new way of life. To avoid
the negativisrn of b'1e vie\" that we are always
in the wrong in our dealings with the envi
ronment, let this be thought of as learning
to live in harmony with nature.

Oh, Bother, you are warm beside me
And your milk flows sweetly.
::: v/ould not stray,
But close to you, I learn our way.
Nay vIe frolic in the soft meadow
Wf18re Sllil p:>urs forth ulX)n the grass?
Together graze and linger?
Taste of the clear brook?
Wf" gather with our kind

Beneath the sheltering tree
And. as twilight scents the air
Your loving comforts me.

Notes

Awaiting with bowed heads
'Ehe dawning of tomorrow,
In t...he dark we dream and pray:
Let not the hand of man take us away.

1.

York:

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New
Avon Books, 1975): 7.
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ty rather· than of inner peace.
Injustice,
disharrrony,
waste and wanton destruction
arise from hurran ignorance. It is the wisdom
of enlightened self-interest that recognizes
the importance of obe:lience to the Law that
Bill Neidjie so vividly details for his peo
ple who have lived for some 50,000 years in
civilized harrrony with their environment.
As the lKung bushmen see it,

we are all
of the same dream that is dreaming us
(i.e., of the same creation).
We destroy
this dream when we do not live according to
the Law.
part
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2. Jerrold Tannenbaum, Review of Mi
chael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experi
mentation, The Scientist 1 ( oct 20, 1986) :
19, 22.

'!be reality of dream-time is difficult
for non-native westerners to comprehend. Poet
Rainer Marie Rilke in the Duino Elegies comes
close to it, referring to it as the invisi
ble. He observes:

3. Robert E. Goodin, "Ethical Princi
ples for Environmental Protection, II in Robert
Elliot and Arron Gare, eds., Environmental
Philosophy (University Park:
Pennsylvania
State UniversityPress, 1983): 15 (author's
eIf\Phasis).

Transitoriness is everywhere plunging
into profound Being.
Nature, the
things we move about am::mg and use are
provisional and perishable; tut so long
as we are here, they are our possession
and our friendship, sharers in our trou
ble and gladness, just as they have been
the confidants of our ancestors. There
fore, not only must all that is here not
be corrupted or degraded, tut, just
because of that very provisionality they
share with us, all these appearances and
things should be comprehended by us in a
most fervent understanding and trans
formed. Transformed? Yes, for our task
is to stamp this provisional, perishing
earth into ourselves so deeply, so pain
fully and passionately, that its being
nay rise again "invisibly" in us.

4.
bridge:
30.

5. Tom Regan,
The Case for Animal
-- --- -- - - Rights (Berkeley:
University of California
Press, 1983).
6. To deliberately cause harm to others
with no desire for personal gain is p.Jre
maliciousness and evil.
To deliberately
cause harm with the sole intent of benefiting
from another's suffering is using another as
a mere means to one's own ends and is at
least as evil.
one can think of examples
where it is not wrong to benefit from an
other's suffering, but these would generally
have to do with self-defense or self-protec
tion.

In other words, we must consciously
become part of the dream that is dreaming us
all, or at least obey the Law, even if we do
not apprehend its source and wisdom. This is
the path to world peace, the way of beauty,
justice, humility, compassion and love. Lao
Tzu called this quite simply, Tao.
And the
Law of the Tao for all civilizations is to
respect that the loving harrrony of hurranity
and Nature (symbolized in the embrace of yin
and yang) is the way of fulfillment for the
whole of creation-and for the "Dreamer of
the dream that is dreaming us" everywhere.

7. The quotations
are from
Albert
Schweitzer,
Civilization and Ethics (The
Philosophy of Civilization, Part III) , 2nd
ed., trans. C. T. Campion (London: A. & C.
Black, 1929): 260, 264, and ~ ~ and
Thought, trans. C. T. Campion (London: A. Y
C. Black, 1933): 271.
8. John Passmore, Man's ReSponsibility
Ecological Problems and Western
for Nature:
Traditions,
2nd 00. (London:
Duckworth,
1980): 84.

Notes
1.
In Kadaku Man (N.S.W.
Mybrood pIL, Inc., 1985).
BErWEEN THE SPEX::IES

Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Carn
Harvard University Press, 1978):
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